Hidden services are anonymously hosted services that can be accessed over an anonymity network, such as Tor. While most hidden services are legitimate, some host illegal content. There has been a fair amount of research on locating hidden services, but an open problem is to develop a general method to prove that a physical machine, once confiscated, was in fact the machine that had been hosting the illegal content. In this paper we assume that the hidden service logs requests with some timestamp, and give experimental results for leaving an identifiable fingerprint in this log file as a timing channel that can be recovered from the timestamps. In 60 minutes, we are able to leave a 36-bit fingerprint that can be reliably recovered.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider the problem of leaving fingerprints in the log files of hidden services so that if the machine hosting the service is recovered by law enforcement the fingerprint can be recovered as proof that particular machine was hosting the service. Our threat model is the following. Illegal content is being hosted on a hidden service of an anonymity network such as Tor [6] . Hidden services allow clients on the anonymity network to access the service while preserving the anonymity of both the client and server. The server's IP address is not revealed to clients, instead clients request the service using a pseudodomain, e.g., http://gaddbiwdftapglkq.onion/. There are many ways that the hidden service can be identified, both technical (e.g., the methods [13, 19, 1, 14, 17] that we describe in Section 6 where we discuss related works) and non-technical (e.g., the crime is reported). In this paper we consider the following problem: given a hidden service that is believed to be hosted by a machine that will be confiscated by law enforcement, how can we leave a fingerprint on the machine through the hidden service that can be recovered and identified on the physical machine at a later time 1 ? The threat model we assume in this paper is a passive observer that does not suspect this form of fingerprinting but does observe bursts in the log file. A stronger threat model where the hidden service host suspects that fingerprinting will be employed is left for future work. The approach we take in this paper is to assume that the underlying service that is being offered as a hidden service has a log file of client requests that contains a timestamp. Logging can be disabled for hidden services, but the client information and information about traffic can be valuable to those offering the service for many reasons. Furthermore, the fact that suspects can erase their fingerprints in the physical world does not change the fact that dusting for fingerprints is a standard practice for non-digital crimes.
For our implementation, we use an Apache web server. By making requests to the service from a client on the anonymity network that will be logged, we can create an additive timing channel to leave the fingerprint in the log. The main challenge for this type of channel is the tradeoff between stealth and the amount of time it takes to leave the fingerprint. Because IP addresses are hidden by anonymity technologies, we assume that during the process of recovering the fingerprint no distinction can be made between the added requests and requests from real Figure 1 : Web server traffic for a 24-hour period.
clients. The two main sources of noise that must be accounted for through redundancy in the fingerprint, then, are the delays of requests that are added by the anonymity network and bursts in the actual traffic from real clients for that particular service. We present results that characterize both of these sources of noise, and describe an implementation that can leave an easily recoverable 36-bit fingerprint in an Apache log file over the Tor network in 60 minutes. There are three main reasons why, among the many information channels various log files afford, we focus on only timing channels using the timestamps:
• For legal reasons, standardized methods are preferable to ad-hoc methods, because precedents can be established for well-analyzed algorithms for recovering a footprint. This requires that a single method be used for many services, and, while various services log different data that is application-specific, most contain some sort of timestamp.
• Anonymization technologies sometimes hide IP addresses, URLs, and other objects in the log file. For example, when Apache is set up as a Tor hidden service using privoxy [20] , the IP address for all logged GET requests is 127.0.0.1 due to local proxying. Timing information, on the other hand, is typically preserved.
• By using exclusively timing and timestamps for leaving the fingerprint, the other channels of information (e.g., the URL of the document being requested)
can be reserved for other information that the fingerprinter may want to preserve in the log (e.g., proof of the existence of a file on the server at a given time).
An important property that a forensic technique should have is generality. For Tor hidden services, a unique private key on the confiscated machine will easily identify that machine as the host of the hidden service. Other anonymity networks or future versions of Tor may not have this, however. A technique that can be established and used for a wide variety of cases is preferable to application-specific forensic techniques applied on a caseby-case basis. One possible act the suspect might do is to uninstall Tor or disable himself from the anonymous network, which will make it harder to recover his unique private key that he used to offer the hidden service. Suppose the log files are disabled on the hidden server or the attacker uses an encrypted file system. Depending on the noise model, a timing channel may appear in statistical packet capture logs of the suspect's local network or Internet Service Provider (e.g., Cisco's Netflow [2] ). Thus, for this paper we acknowledge that there are many ways to prove that a confiscated machine was hosting a hidden service but our focus is on timing channels.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, we describe our measurement methodology for characterizing the two main sources of noise in Section 2, followed by the results from these measurements in Section 3. Then, we describe our implementation of hidden service fingerprinting in Section 4. A discussion of stealth techniques and possibilities for future work is in Section 5. Related works are discussed in Section 6, fol-lowed by the conclusion.
Measurement methodology
In this section we describe our methodology for two sets of measurements: delays of HTTP GET requests in the Tor network, and the traffic characteristics of existing GET requests for a web service. Because our fingerprinting method uses an additive code where GET requests are added to existing traffic in the log file, Tor network delays and existing GET requests are the two main sources of noise that must be accounted for to reliably recover the fingerprint.
Tor network delays
To measure the delays of (and potentially also dropping of) GET requests that the fingerprinter as a client will send to the hidden web service, we set up two Linux machines. One hosts the Apache web server version 2.2.12 as a Tor hidden service and is configured using privoxy [20] , which acts as a local web proxy interface to the Tor network. Thus, all GET requests appear to come from the IP address 127.0.0.1, which is the loopback interface. The Apache log file logs GET requests when they are received, with a granularity of 1 second. For these experiments, the other machine acts as a web client, also configured with privoxy, with wget as the web client which makes requests for the hidden service. The server and client were located in the same place geographically, but Tor onion routing default configuration is to set up a new circuit between server and client every ten minutes 2 where the client chooses different entry, exit, and intermediate relays which are geographically distributed across the globe. For measurement purposes only, each GET request was tagged with a unique integer identifier so that we could easily detect dropping and reordering of packets. For our fingerprinting implementation in Section 4, we assume that no such identifier can be put in the GET request and use only the timing channel.
We sent a GET request from the client to the server every 5 seconds for 55 hours, to ascertain the distribution of delays introduced by onion routing and the connection loss rate. Because different circuits being built on a global scale every 10 minutes (after their first use) accounts for most of the variance in Tor delays, diurnal patterns were not evident in this data so we consider it as a single distribution independent of the time of day. 2 The countdown of these ten minutes start after the first use of each circuit, and will not cutoff an existing session even if it exceeds this time limit.
Existing HTTP GET requests
The other major source of noise in our fingerprint timing channel is existing traffic in the log file. For our implementation, we assume that the fingerprinter, when recovering the fingerprint, cannot distinguish their requests from existing requests (from real clients that are accessing the service). The additive channel is thus prone to errors due to bursts of traffic in the web server, so we sought to characterize existing traffic for a real web server. We obtained the log file for a university department that runs Apache 2.2.3 and receives approximately 35K to 40K requests per day. The log file we obtained covers a 36-hour time period.
We calculated the distribution of GET requests per minute for a normal web service using this log file. We assert that this distribution shape is representative of typical web services, but the mean of the distribution depends on how popular the web service is. Our fingerprinting technique assumes that the fingerprinter has some estimate of this mean for a given web service that they want to fingerprint 3 .
It is an open research question to know the mean of a given web service but one possible solution is to take this mean value from the law enforcement who could obtain this information from the ISPs of some exit nodes of the anonymous network. Figure 1 shows the number of requests over time for this department web log file. There is a spike in traffic at about midnight MDT (Mountain Daylight Time), which corresponds to late afternoon local time. We designed our fingerprinting algorithm to be robust for any hour of the day, but since the fingerprinter can choose when to leave the fingerprint they can also choose a time of day when the traffic for the web service is known to be lower.
Measurement results
The purpose of our measurements was to characterize the two main sources of noise for our fingerprinting technique: delays or connection drops by the Tor network and existing traffic in the web service log file. The main tradeoff we consider in this paper is the amount of time it takes to leave the fingerprint vs. the number of requests we need to make per minute. The faster fingerprinting is performed, the more requests per minute will be necessary to reliably recover the fingerprint. Our main consideration in this paper is this tradeoff, we do not make any claims regarding the stealthiness of our current implemention. Other stealth techniques besides reducing the rate of requests are discussed in Section 5. The main questions regarding the speed vs. request rate tradeoff that we sought to answer are:
1. When the fingerprinter sends a request, what is the loss rate and distribution of delays for when the server actually sees and logs the request? This is one of the two major sources of noise in our timing channel fingerprinting. Note that anonymity networks such as Tor deliberately route packets in unpredictable ways, meaning that the delays will also be much more unpredictable than normal Internet traffic.
2. What is the distribution of existing traffic in a web service log file? In particular, the relationship between the number of requests we add per minute and bit error rate when recovering the fingerprint is determined by this distribution. Figure 2 shows the histogram for the delays added to requests by the Tor network from our measurements. The mean delay is 21.1. Not pictured are the 2975 requests that were dropped. Based on the measured probability density, 83.6% of sent requests will be logged by the server within a minute of being sent, 8.9% will arrive after more than a minute, and 7.5% will be dropped. Based on these results, for our additive timing channel we chose to send all requests for a 60-second period in a burst at the beginning of the 60-second period. They will arrive with roughly the same distribution shown in Figure 2 . Because of these delays, the server will not see the packets in a burst as the client had sent them. This is important so that conspicuous bursts of traffic do not appear in the log file. Figure 3 shows the distribution of requests per minute for the university department log file. This distribution helps us to predict the rate of errors due to existing requests that we can expect for different numbers of requests per minute added. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , which shows this error rate for the parameters we chose for our implementation as the shaded area under the intersection between the two curves (the bold line is the same distribution with 35 added to each value). For this chosen parameter of adding 35 requests in a minute for our additive channel, the error rate for errors that are due to existing requests is approximately 11.5% and the optimal cutoff to determine whether requests were added to a given minute is 40. Lowering the parameter of 35 to make the fingerprint less conspicuous will move the bold curve to the left and increase the error rate, meaning that longer error correction codewords are needed and therefore more time is required to leave a fingerprint that can be reliably recovered. Increasing this parameter moves the bold curve to the right which decreases the error rate and makes fingerprinting quicker, but creates a more conspicuous burstiness in the log file. Figure 3 shows the same shape for the histogram as previous work on measuring Tor network delays [11] , but the mean of our histogram is different. One possible rea- son for this is that the Tor network has grown considerably in the past several years. Another possible reason is that in that work changes were made to the Tor client to choose the first introduction point from the hidden service descriptor, whereas our measurements are end-toend application-layer measurements from when the request was made by the client to when the server logged the incoming GET request. In general, we found the Tor network delays to have a large amount of variance between different circuits. In our additive channel, we can account for this variance, but in future work to improve the stealthiness of fingerprinting a more detailed and upto-date model of Tor network delays will be needed.
Tor delays

Existing HTTP GET requests
Implementation
Based on the results in Section 3, we developed a prototype implementation of timing channel log file fingerprinting that is based on an additive channel that is superencoded with a Reed-Solomon code [22] . In this section we describe the implementation and present results to demonstrate that it is robust to Tor delays and existing requests in terms of the ability to reliably recover the fingerprint.
Our implementation starts with a random 36-bit bitstring that will serve as the fingerprint. In this way, the probability of recovering a matching fingerprint by chance is approximately 1 2 36 ≈ 1.46 × 10 −11 . Before being sent over the Tor network to appear in the server log file, this fingerprint is superencoded as a Reed-Solomon code word, which is 60 bits in length. Reed-Solomon coding is an error correction code that uses redundancy of the original word in a codeword that is based on an oversampled polynomial to recover from errors automatically (in contrast to an error detection code, in which errors could be detected, but not corrected).
We then transmit this 60-bit codeword, at a rate of 1 bit per minute, to the server's log file as follows. To transmit a 0 in a given minute, we do nothing. To transmit a 1 we make 35 requests for the hidden service over the Tor network at the beginning of the minute. These requests will arrive at the server and be logged with the distribution shown in Figure 2 . The overall shape of the distribution of requests that will be seen in the log is not conspicuous, as is shown in Figure 8 where lights bars show the histogram before fingerprinting and dark bars show the histogram after fingerprinting. Note that Figure 8 is normalized, the difference in magnitude between the distributions can be noticeable to the attacker but our threat model assumes a passive attacker who is not suspicious that fingerprinting is taking place (stronger threat models are left as future work).
To recover the fingerprint once the log file is obtained, we scan the log file near the time when the fingerprint was transmitted and attempt to recover the code word as follows. Within a minute, we read a 0 if less than 40 requests appear in the log file within that minute, and a 1 for 40 or more requests. The cut-off value of 40 was chosen because this is the approximate intersection point for the two graphs in Figure 4 , which minimizes errors. We then apply Reed-Solomon error correction and compare the word that is recovered from the measured codeword to the fingerprint. When a match is found, then we are highly confident that the log file provided is the log file for the hidden webservice that was fingerprinted. Bit errors can occur in two different ways, which are discussed in Section 4.1.
We tested our fingerprinting implementation for different hours of the day for the department log file as follows. First, we do the fingerprinting for a Tor hidden service and record the requests as they are received by our hidden service. Then we superimpose this onto an hour of the log file. This is equivalent to doing the fingerprint live, since we are using an additive channel, but allows for repeatability of our results and does not require access to a hidden service that receives a lot of traffic. We tested the fingerprinting 24 times (once for each hour of the day) and were able to recover the fingerprint 22 times. This includes three tests that were performed for the three highest-traffic hours of Figure 1 . We did this to test the robustness of the fingerprinting implementation in the limit. The fingerprints recovered in the two cases that failed had a low Hamming distance with the original fingerprint, but our results suggest that leaving multiple fingerprints at different times of day is important in practice.
Note that Reed-Solomon codes perform well for correlated bit errors, which is why they are used in scenarios such as compact disc encoding where bit errors can be due to scratches. Thus, the small correlations between bit errors in our scheme (such as delayed requests showing up in the next minute) are easily handled by the superencoding.
Example
Here we give an example of one iteration of fingerprinting. The process is shown in Figure 7 . The process can be repeated to leave multiple fingerprints at different hours of the day for added robustness, but here we describe only one iteration, which takes 60 minutes. The first step is to choose a random 36-bit word as the fingerprint. In our example we choose "1101 1000 1111 0011 1100 0101 1010 0010 1101". The second step is to apply Reed-Solomon encoding to produce a 60-bit codeword: "1001 1101 0110 0101 1001 1010 1101 1000 1111 0011 1100 0101 1010 0010 1101". For each minute in the 60-minute process, if the corresponding sequential bit in the codeword is a 0, we do nothing, if it is a 1 we make 35 requests from a Tor client to the hidden service at the beginning of the minute.
After the fingerprinting process is complete, we assume that the machine that hosted the hidden service has been physically recovered (e.g., by law enforcement) and then the second half of the process is to recover the 36-bit fingerprint. To account for inaccuracies in the hidden server's system time, the process of attempting to recover the fingerprint can be repeated for some number of seconds into the past or future. For a given start time alignment, the 60-bit codeword that is received in the log file is generated as follows. For each sequential minute, we record a 0 if less than 40 total requests appear in the log during that minute, and a 1 if 40 or more appear. If there are 12 bit errors or less in the recovered 60-bit codeword then applying Reed-Solomon decoding to this codeword Figure 5 : How a 60-bit codeword appears in the log file.
Cut-off
Bit flip
will produce the original 36-bit fingerprint.
There are two types of bit flips. One is that the number of requests from actual clients during that minute is very low and thus the number of requests we add to the log file for a 1 (which can be less than 35 if Tor drops some connections or delays them for more than 60 seconds) is not sufficient to put the total above the threshold of 40. This will flip a bit in the codeword from 1 to 0. The more common type of bit flip is from 0 to 1. This happens when either the number of existing requests from actual clients already exceeds the threshold, or it is near the threshold and a few delayed requests from a previous bit in the codeword show up during that minute instead of the earlier minute they were intended for. 
Discussion and future work
In this paper we have explored the tradeoff in terms of how long it takes to leave a fingerprint in a hidden service log file vs. how much traffic must be added per minute. The threat model we assumed was a passive observer that does not suspect this form of fingerprinting but does observe bursts in the log file. For future work, we plan to explore the tradeoffs in a stronger threat model where the hidden web service host suspects that fingerprinting will be employed so that an extra degree of stealth in leaving the fingerprint is required.
In our work under progress we are modelling the probability distribution of the network delays, which is required for a closed-form expression of the uncoded bit error probability. This expression will in turn constitute the basis for predicting the probability of correct detection when superencoding is used. Furthermore, a time domain analysis of the gathered data will provide useful elements for the design of channel coding mechanisms, as they will depend among other factors on the coherence time. For instance, preliminary results show that the autocorrelation of the observed data can be reasonably modelled by an autoregressive process. The fact that the delays corresponding to consecutive requests are strongly correlated suggests that a differential encoding scheme would be beneficial.
A good model for both the distribution and the second order statistics of the request delay is also crucial for an information-theoretic approach to the problem, which will reveal what the fundamental limits of this delay-based An underlying assumption of our current fingerprinting technique is that the fingerprinter has a good estimate of the mean of traffic requests per minute for the hidden service. This estimate can be an overestimate, which will cause the fingerprinter to use more redundant bits than necessary for superencoding and take longer than necessary to do the fingerprint. Overestimation also makes the fingerprinting more conspicuous. For future work, we plan to explore methods for estimating the traffic rate of a hidden service indirectly and accurately. For example, infrequent observations of the last access/modification time have been shown to be useful in estimating the access/modification rate [12] . A more general way to estimate the traffic load of a hidden service is still an open problem, however. What is needed is a way to exhaust a resource on the hidden server without first exhausting some resource within the anonymity network, and then a way to infer traffic load from the scarcity of that resource in a non-conspicuous way.
Related work
The work most related to ours is efforts to locate hidden servers. Overlier and Syverson [19] describe several different methods for locating hidden services in Tor and provide recommendations to prevent them, which were adopted by the Tor project. Murdoch and Danezis [14] consider the problem of traffic analysis, and Murdoch [17] considers Internet Exchange-level adversaries. Bauer et al. [1] describe attacks on Tor anonymity based on nodes misrepresenting the amount of resources they have. Murdoch [13] demonstrates that it is possible to determine whether a given IP address is hosting a particular hidden service or not based on clock skew. The basic idea is to send some amount of traffic to the hidden service, and query for TCP timestamps from the IP address suspected of hosting the service. As the server becomes busier, it will heat up causing a timing skew in the quartz crystal that maintains the system time, which will be seen in the timestamps. Murdoch also shows some results suggesting that geolocation is possible based on diurnal patterns associated with heat. In contrast to these works, our work assumes that the hidden server has been located and we describe a way to prove that a physical machine (once confiscated) was the one that had been hosting the service.
Our work falls in the general domain of covert timing channels [23, 9, 10, 8, 7] . There has been a considerable amount of work on creating and detecting covert timing channels based on TCP/IP [3, 18, 15] . To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to consider timing channels as a method for leaving fingerprints in hidden service log files.
The relationship of our measurement results for Tor delays to the results of Loesing et al. [11] was described in Section 3. Other works have considered the timing characteristics of Tor and other anonymity networks in the context of timing attacks on anonymity [4, 5, 21, 16 ].
Conclusion
We demonsrated a technique for leaving timing channel fingerprints in hidden service log files. The technique presented in this paper is robust, even for the random delays introduced by the Tor network and realistic, bursty traffic from existing clients for the web service. We were able to reliably recover a 36-bit fingerprint with a 60-minute fingerprinting process.
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